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STATTMtrNT OF JURISDICTION
This case presents an appeal ofa post-divorce order enforcing the provisions ofa
decree of divorce. The Utah Coul of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Am. $ 7844-103(2Xh).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR RI,VIEW
ISS-U.E_N.Q-!, Appellee Ms. Mitchell rcstates lssue No. I as Ibllows:
Whether the district court was correct in ruling that Respondent Nathaniel M. Mitchetl's
agreement to assign his interest in the parties' undividedjoint intcrest in ajudgment
agains( Steven Coll ins (thc "Coll ins Judgnent") to MDI Equity Partners, LLC]
(hereinafter "MDI") remained his "individual obligation" under paragraph l9 ofthc
parties Decree ol' Divorce ("I)ecree")-
This is a queslion of law which this Clourt reviews "1br correctness, according no
particular del'erence to the trial court's ac(ions." Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, !112.
973 P.2d 431,434 (citing State v. Pena,869 P.2d 932,936 (Urah 1994).
!SU,E![QJ: Appellee Ms. Mitchcll restares lssue No. 2 as follows:
Whether the district court ened in ordering disribution ofthe proceeds ol'thc Ctollins
Judgment. per the panies' Decrec ofDivorce. with one-halfthe procecds to Ms. Mitchell
and one-hall'to Mr. Mitchell, with Ms. Mitchell receivjng one-halfthe proceeds. net lhc
pal1ies' agreed-upon one-third paymenr to their attorncy, lellnet the parties' obligation to
their attomey and Mr- Mitchell's obligarion ro MDI.
This is a question of law which this Court reviews "fbr colaeclness. according no
particufar deference to the trial coun's acl.iotrs," Moonv. Moon, 1999 UTApp 12.flI2,
973 P-2d 431, 43a @iling State v. Penq, 869 P.2d 932 (Urah 1994).
ISS.UE-Nq3: Appellee Ms. Mitcheli restates lssue No. 3 as follows:
Did dre district court erl in ru]ing that "As the total 2002 Collins distribution was
approximately $180.000 and Respondent remitted l/3 to Mr. Mcsmer and l/3 to satisfy
or panially satisfy MDI (his stipulated and Court-allecated ebt), distdbuted l/6 to
Petitioner, and inappropdately retained l/6, the additional sum due Petilioner is
approximatcly $30,000.00?"
"ln ordcr to challenge a coun's lactual flndings, an appellanl must tirst marshal all
tbe evidencc in supporl ofthc linding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally
insuflicient to support the linding even when viewing it in a light most l'avorablc to the
court befow." Sweet v. Sweet,2006 UTApp2l6.'!l 6 (qu<\ting Chen v. Stewart,2004 UT
82,ll 76, 100P.3dII77. This Couft reviews a district court's l 'actual t jndings fbr clear
€rror. 1/., f 'n.3 (cit ingSlate v. lf iddison,200l tJT60,ll 60,28P.3dI278).
ISSUES PRESERVED FOR APPEAL
Mr. Mitchell argued that his assignment removed his joint interest in the Collins
Judgment completely liom the marital estate and abrogated any debt or obligation he
might have had lo MDI before rhe panies' divorce, resulting in Mr. Mitchell having no
debt or obligation to MDI and leaving only Ms. Mitchell's joint intercst subject to
allocation at the (ime ofthe paflies' Decfee at thc Order to Show Cause hearing held
April22,200t). (R.222:5.9-10) Mr. Mitchcll reiterated his argument in Rcspondenr's
Objcction to the Commissioner's Recommendation. (R. 108-113)
Mr. Mitchell could not have preserved a spccific issue to the district court.s order
that MDI be paid l'rom Mr- Mitchell's sharc ol'the Collins la*suit, as the district court did
not order paymcnt to MDI. (R.96-100; 155- t6 t) However, Mr. Mitchell did objc,ct ro
the Commissioncr's Recommendation on thc grounds that his obligation to MDI \\as
completely satislied at the tine the l)ecree was onlercd and that only Ms. Mitchell.sioint
interest subi€ct to allocation at the time ofthe partics' Decree. (R. 109-1 2) As
identitied above, Ms. Mitchell argued that the parties'I)ccree divided r.hc en(irc Collins
Judgment proceeds onc-halfto Ms. Mitchell and one-halfto Mr. Mitchell and that Mr.
Mitchell's obligation to MDI was his own scparate obligarion under the I)ecree. (R.56-
58;60-61,222: l0-I9) Ms. Mitchelt reitcrated these poil.rrs and argued thar rhe dis[rict
court's ruling was also corect because Mr. Mitchell maintained interest and control over
the Collinsjudgment, Mr. Mitchell had un obligation to MDI under his assignmenl
v l
agreemenr, and the Statute ofFrauds bats the enforcement of Mr. Mitchell's a$si$ment
against Ms. Mitchell. (R. 14l-153)
Mr. Mitchell did not preserve his objection to the district courts' language, to
which he now objccts. Mr. Mitchell objected to the Commissioner's Recomrnendation.
(R. 107- 13 8) Flowever, the specilic language to which hc takes exception was not in the
('ommissioner's Minutc Emry. Mr. Mitchell did make l'actual allegations which
contradict he language to which Mr. Mitchell takes exceptiou; however, he did not
object to the form or content oflhe Findings and Order (Hearing April 22. 2009) as his
Objection to Commissioncr's Recommendation and argument hcrein werc submittcd
prior 1() the dist cl court's order. See Respondent's Obiectioll 1() the ('omntissioner's
Recommendation. (R. 107- 13 8 ) See a/so [.indings and Ordcr ( ttearing April 22,2009)
(R. t55- l6 l  )
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
l. Utrh Code Ann. I 25-5-4 (2(Mt:
(l) The followilg agreements are void unless the agrcemenl. or
somc note or memorandum ofthe agreement, is in writing, signed by
the party to be charged with the agreement commitmcnt:
(a) every agreemcnt that by its terms is not bc performed
within one year from the makiDg ofthe agreement;
(b) every pronrise to answer for the deb1, default. or
miscaniage of another. .
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
l. Nature ofthe Cmq Course ofProce€dings and Disposition.
This case involves interprctation and enforcemgnt ofthe parties' l)ecree of
Divorce entered by this Court on or about July 19. 2002 (hereinafter the "Decree"). lt is
an appeal from a final order ofthe district ceurt.
At issue in this cirsc are thc interpretation. application and cnlbrcemcnl ot
paragraphs l8- l9 and 20 ol thc Decree, which allocatc debt and divide thc parties'
intcrcst in thc procecds ol'two lawsuits, the ('hristensen lawsuit arrd the Cbllins lawsuit.
It is the divisbn and distribution ol'the procccds from thc ('ollins lalvsuit (hereinallcr the
"Cloll ins Juclgment"), pul'suanl() thcsc paraglaphs. which is disputcd and ot issuc hcrc.
Subsequent to thc cntry ol'thc Dccrcc. there wcrc two distributions ol'nronics
rolated to the Cdlins Judgment, thc Iirst in August 2002 and thc sccond in Decembcr
2008. Somc nronths aller the delivcry ofthe Dccember 2008 Coll ins Judgncnl
distribution, thc parties wcre at an impasse and unable to resolvc their dillbrcnccs as to
the entirc Collins Judgment lurd the matter wlrs submitted to the district cour(.
On or about March 9.2009. Mr. Mitchell obtained an Ordcr to Show Cause. 1he
origiml headDg date was continucd, and Ms. Mitchell Illcd her Rcsponsc to Ordcr to
Show Cause and Counter Motion to Enlbrce Decrce and lbr Contempt. on or about April
15. 2009. On April22,2009. a hcaring on thc parties' motions was held in the distdct
coun belbrc the Honorablc Michelle Blomquist. District Courl Commissioner.
Commissioner Blomquist issued a Minute Entry decision on June 30, 2009,
recommendirg that Mr. Mitchell's request for relief be denied and that Ms. Mitchell's
request lbr rclief be granled. Counsel for Ms. Mitchell was inskucted to draft the Order.
Mr. Mitchell filed his Objection to the Commissioner's Recomocndation on July 14.
2009. The Findings and Order (Hearing April 22, 2009) were entered by the district
court on July 30,2009. Mr. Mitchell did not tile and obiection ro rhe Findings and Order.
Aller briefing, a hearing on Mr. Mitchell's Objection to rhe Commissioner's
Recommendation was held October 19, 2009, the Honorable Tyrone B. Medley, District
Court Judge, presiding. Following the hearing,lhe district courl overruled Mr. Mitchell's
Objection to the Commissioner's Recommendation. tinding that Mr. Mitchell failed ro
establish that Conrmissioner Illomquisl abused her discretion or committed an error of
law. Mr. Mitchell did not include a transcript ol'the hearing before Judgc Medlcy lbr the
record on appeal.
I|. Statement of Facts.
l. The panies were mauied January 27, 1971.(R, 1)
2. Somctime betbre the end of 1990. the partics obtained a judgment by
def'ault in their suit against Steven A. Collins, Chrisline Letendre Collins, Charles E.
Black and Jeffenon, Currier & Company. Inc. (hereinaflcr the "Collins Judgmcnr'"). (R.
42t 103', 122)
3. In December 1994, the FDIC obtained aiudgment against Mr. Mitchell.
xl
(R. 42)
4. Subscquently. the FDIC assigned itsjudgment against Mr. Mitchell to MDI
Equity Partners. LLC (hereinafter "MDI"). (R. 42)
5. In May 1998. Mr. Mitchell a.nd only Mr. Mitchell entcred into an
agreement with MDI regarding the LDIC judgment against Respondent held by MDL
This agreemcnt, nemo alized in a lefter datcd May 7, 1998. l'rom Mr, Mitchell's
attorney. Scott B. Mitchell. to MDI (the "Agreemenl Lctter"). invoh'ed Mr. Mitchel!'s
assignmcnt ol "his intercst", less attomcv lecs, in the Collins Judgment. in exchange lbr
MDI's assignment ofthe FDICjudgrnent and related paper to Mr. Milchell. In this letlcr,
Mr. Mitchcll promiscd Mf)l "Naas share ofany anrount collcotcd" lion the Collins
Judgmnet. (R. I l5- | l9)
6. Mr. Mitchell remaincd involvod and crulinued to maintoin control over thc
ellbrts to collect or the Ci)llins Judgment. whioh coDtrol includcd changes in
distributions and arranBemcnts concerning payment with MDI subsequcnt to May 7-
1998. recalcuLlations l lhc distribulion of"assigncd" l irnds to MD[. and discussions of
escro*.ing tlre assigned procccds. pcnding claim by MDI witlr potential subsequent
additional distrib$ion if no claim or inquiry was madc by MDI. (R. 7li)
7. The parlies divorce and the De0rcc u'as entercd.luly 22. 2002. (R. 29,34)
8. Paragraph 20 ol'the Decree statcs: "That the petitioncr arrd the respondent
arc involvcd in two lawsuits and that petitioner bc and she is awarded one-third ofany
proceeds, tl'rat respondent be and he is hereby au'arded one-thiId o1'any procceds. and that
Scott Mitchell be awarded onc-third ofany proceeds received l'rom the Christenscn
XII
lawsuit. and that petitioner and respondent each be and they arc hereby awarded one-half
ofany proceeds rec€ived from the Collins lawsuit." (R.32)
9. Paragraphs l8 and l9 ofthe Decree allocate to each pafy their own
"individual dcbts and obligations.'' (R.32)
10. In August 2002, shoftly after Lhe pafties' Dccree, a piece ofnrail addressed
to both parties liom Frank B. Mesmer, the attomey handling the Clollins Judgment fbr the
parties'. was delivered to Ms. Mitchell's residence, which Ms. Mitchell delivered to Mr.
Mitchelf , unopened- (R.222:16)
I l. After r€ceiving thc piecc of rnail. Mr. Mitchell notified Ms. Mitchcll rhat it
centained proceeds from the Coll ins Judgment. (R.222:16) Thc pa(ies met at a bank.
executed and deposited thc check, which was in the dmour'rlol $66.274.79, into Ms.
Mitchell 's account. (R.222:16-17) Upon Mr. Mitchell 's rcquest, Ms. Mitchcll
immediatcly wrote Mr. Mitchell a check in tho amount of $33.137.40 (one penny more
than halfol the total check deposited). which is the sum Mr. Mitchell told Ms. Mitchell
he was entit led to. (R.79.222:17\
12. Ms. Mitchell was unaware ofany previous dis[ribution or payrnent 10 MD].
and she paid Mr. Mitchell what she bclieved was onc-hall-thc ollins Judgmcnt proceeds,
pursuant o the Decree. (R.222: l7-18)
13. In December 2008. Mr. Mesmer sent aurother check. payable jointly to the
parties in thc sum of $267,128.21. (R. 222:18; 78)
14, Ms. Mitchell came to realize" after conversation witlt Mr. Mesmer, that Mr.
Mitchell's entire portion ofthe proceeds had gone toward satisfaction ofhis obligations
x l
rmder the Decree and his assignment to MDI and that Mr. Mitchell had claimed one-half
ofher share ofthe proceeds ofthe Collins Judgnent. (R. 222:18)
15. Thc parties could not agree upotrthe distibution ofthe proceeds from the
2008 Collins Judgment distribution, with Ms. Mitchell believing that she was entitled to
one-halfofthe entire procceds (both the 2002 and the 2008 distributions) and Mr.
Mitcheil insisting that be was entitled to one-half ol'Ms. Mitchell's sharc of tbe proceeds.
(R.41;59)
16. Pursuant to tho agreement ofthe parties, the 2008 distribution check was
signed and deposited into Ms. Miichcll's counsel's trust account. (R.44)
17. As both parties had a contractual obligation to Mr. Mesrrrer lbr one-third
the procaeds. they subsequently agreed upon dispersing paymont ofone-third (l/3) ofthc
proc€eds ol'the 2008 disbursement from thc Collins Judgmcnt o satisfy their respective
obligations 10 Mr. Mesmer. (l{. 222: l,
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The district coufi found that the pafiies' Decree was uuambiguous and interpreted
ils meaning using the principles of contract inlerpretalion as mattor of law. Under the
plain language ol'the parties' Decree ofDivorce, each party i$ entitled to onc-halfthe
proceeds fiom the Collins'judgment and each is responsible for their own obligations
related to the samc monies. Consistent with the Decree and thc ruling below the
proceeds are kr bc divided equally. with the partics responsible for their obligations to
xlv
their attomey in lhc Collins iawsuit, which includes Mr. Mitchell's obligations to NIDI.
under the 1998 assignment ofhis interest in the Collins Judgment.
Contrary to Mr. Mitchell's repeated assertions that hc owed no debt or obligation
to MDI al the time of divorce. Mr. Mirchell had an obligation to MDl, ro divide his
intcrcst from that ol'Ms. Mitchell and to collect and pay "his sha1e" of thc proceeds liom
the Coll ins Judgment, lcss the monics owcd to the parties' attomey. to MDl. In
contracting to assign -his share" ol-the Collins Judgment. Mr- Mitchcll incurred these
obligations. in cxchange lbr MDI's assignrrcnt of all interest it held in the lcttcr ofcredit
and judgmenl agaiDsl Mr. Mitchcll and thc l i l ing 01'a satisfaction ol
.iudgmonl. Ihese
obligations cxistcd at thc time ol the partics' [)ecree. Thus. Mr. Mitchell had an
obligation to Ml)l at lhc time ol-the Dccrcc undcr his agrccmcnt witlr MDI and his
agrrcment with M[)1. which would not bc salisl icd unti l alicr thc cnlty ol 'the parties'
Decrcc.
Exanlination ol thc plain language ol Mr. Mitchell 's agrecmcnt with MDI r.eveals
that the agrccmcnt docs not even purport to allocate the partics' intcrest in the Collins
Judgmcnt. undermining Mr. Mitchell's argurrcnt tiat his assignment extinguished his
obligations to MDI and removed "his sha|e" ol'thc Collins Judgmctrt liom mar-ilal estatc
divided in the parties'Dccree. Further. f ltah's Statute ol'Frauds rvould prohibit he
enforcement ol-thc pre-Decrcc division that Mr. Mitchcll claims. as Ms. Mitchell \r'as
ncither a party nor signatory to the agreemcnt to sadsry Mr- Mitchcll s debt and the
agreement \\'as not to be performed withirr one ycar. Accordingl)- Mr. Mitchell's
obligation to MDI remained ar [re time ol divorce, and the paities' inlerest in thc Coi]ins
Judgmenl was determined and divided by thc clear language ofthe pa(ies, Decree.
Mr. Mitchcll inappropdately raises several disputed and incendiary .facts'
concqming Ms. Mitchell's knowledge ofhis assignment whicb are ofquestionable truth
and are neither relevant o the Cout's decision nor properly before the Coun on appeal.
Thus, the Court should decline to consider these ,facts' and relared argument.
As the district court's ruling is supporled by the unambiguous language ofthe
panies' I)ccree. concerning the division ol'thc pafiies' itrteres( the Collins JudgDent, the
Court should uphold the disrict court's ruling dividing the Collins Judgment accororrg ro
the plain language ofthe Decree.
Mr. Mitchell challenges certain languagc in the district courts' Order. lJowcvcr,
Mr. Mitchell f'ailed to prcserve this issuc tbr appcal in the district court and fhiled to
adequately marshal the evidencc in support ol'this language. Further, the challengcd
languagc is neithcr a linding nor clearly erroneous. Accordingly. the Coun should
dccline to addrcss this issue and should not di$rurb the ruling bclow.
xvi
ARGUMENT
I. MR. MITCIIELL'S OBLIGATION TO MDI, IN RELATION TO THE
COLLINS JUDGMENT, WAS HIS "INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATION"
UNDER PARAGRAPH 19 OF THE PARTIES' DECREE OF DIVORCE.
The district coun was corect in its determination that (hc Dcqee ofDivorce is
unambiguous that Mr. Mitchell's assignment ofhis interest in lhe parties' undivided joint
interest in the Clollins Judgment to MDI remained his "individual obligation'' undcr
paragraph 19, encumbering only his portion ofthe Collins Judgmcnt.
A divorce decree is interpreted "according to established rules of contract
interpretation" Moo, v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12. f l l8, 973 P.2d 431, 435. "When partics
to a contract disagree about thc meaning 01'a provision, principles 01'contract
interpretation require [thc Court] to give ef]bct to the meaning, intcnded by the partics ar
the time tlrcy cntered into thc agreement." Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy,2QO5
Ul App 92. tl 12, 110 P.3d )68, 1'72 (ciL::ng Centrol Fla. Investments, Inc. v. Parkwesl
Assocs.,2OO2 UT 3,11 2. 40 P.3d 599). ln making the legal dctcrmination ofwhether a
contracl is ambiguous or unambiguous. thc Coun may. as the district court did in this
casc, engage in preliminary consjd€ration of"rclcvant, extrinsic evidenoe oftbe lbcts
known to the panies at the time they entered the contract." Id. (aiting Nielsen v. Gold's
Gyn.2003 U'L 37.n 7. 78 P.3d 600) (intemal alteration and pmctuation omitted).
Howcvcr, once it decides Lhat an "agreement is unarnbiguous. thc court must detcnniDe
the padies' intentions f'rom the plain mcaning ol'the contractual language as a matler of
law." ,fd at fl 13 (citing Fairbourn Commercial, Inc. v. American Housing Portners, Inc.,
2004 UT 54, !l 10. 94 P.3d 292) (intemal punctuarion omirted). Thus, a disputed bur
unambiguous decrec ofdivorce should be intcrpreted. under principals ofcontract
inlerprctation. togive legal c1'1'ec[ to rhe meanings intended by the pa(ies' at tho time.
Here. Mr. Mitchcll does not argue that the district court erred in irs dctermination
tltat the Decrec is unambiguous. Instead. he posits that. as a malt$ of law. by the clear
and unambiguous terms ofthe Decrce. Mr. Mitchell's did not have aDy obligation to MDI
at the time ol'the l)ocree.r Contrary to Mr. Mitchell 's assertion, the dist ct court
properly rcad and interpreted the Dccree and reachcd thc conect legal conclusi()n.
Aocordingly and for the reasons ct fbrth below. this Court should re;ecr Mr. Mitchell 's
argument and uphold lhc district courl's dccision.
A. The Districa Couri Correctly Interpreted the Plain Language Decree.
As argucd by thc parties hcrc and bolow. paragrdphs t9 and 20 ol thc l)ccree ol'
l)ivorce control thc allocttion ol dcbt rurd division ol'asscts at issue hcrein.
Parugmph 19 ol'the Decrec ()1'Divorcc, wl'r ich assigns Mr. Mitchell 's dcbts and
obligations. statcs:
19. That the Rcspondent bc al1d he is hcreby order.ed 10
assume and pay and hold harmless from Iiability thereon, the
tbllowing debt trnd obligations:
a. Respondcnt's individual debts rurd obligations;
b. All dcbts and obligations incuned by hint
subsequent to the date ofseparation.
r  Br iefofAppel lant.  p.  l l .
Decrce ofDivorce.lJlg.2 Paragraph l8 ol'the Decree mirronr this language in assigning
Ms. Mitchell's debts and obligations.r The ailocation to the parties is lbr both debts and
obligations.
Paragraph 20 ofthe Decrcc ol-Divorce. which divides the pafiies' interests in the
two outstanding lawsuits. states:
20. -l hat thc petitioner and the resDondcnt are involved in
two lawsuits and that pctitiener be and shc is awardcd one-
third ofany proceeds. that rcspondent bc and hc is hereby
arvarded one-third ol any procccds. and that Scott Mitchell be
au,irded onclhird ol any procccds receivcd fton thc
Christcnscn lawsuit. and thal pctilioner and respo0dent each
bc and thcv are hercbv arvarded onc-hall'ol any proccccls
rcceived ltonr the Coll ins lawslrit.
Dccrcc ol' Divorce, f l20.a
Conspicuously, paragmph 20, cxplicitly dividcs an.v'pr<rcccds l'rom thc
'Christenscn Il lwsuit ' i !rto thirds. rccognizing ancl assiduously protccting thc inlcresl ol '
Mr. Mitchcll 's brothcr and attonrey. Mr. Scott M. Mitchcll. in allocaling onclhird ol 'thc
prooccds to Scotl Mitchcll. ln contrast. on th0 subjcct ol'thc procccds l'r'on) ('ullins
JudgDent. thc l)ecree is silcnt on thc |rlattcr ol attomcy lbes and p()vides no basis to
expcct hat thc partics inlcnded to excuse Mr. Mitchcll 's obligation to MDI or to apply
Mr. Mitchell's assiglme tofhis interest in the Clollins Judgfnetll to MDI against botlr
paftias. Instcad, the Decree clearly divides thc parlies' rcspecrivc interests in the
proceeds ofthe 'Collins lawsuit' equally. one+all'to cach.
'  
R.38.
'  R.38.a R 38 (emphasis added).
Nonetheless and despite thc plain languagc ofthc parties' f)ecree - dividing the
Collins Judgment procccds equally beh{een the partics and assigning each responsibility
lbr their own "individual debt and obligations" - Mr. Mitchell clainls that proceeds tiom
the entire Collins judgmcnt should bc encumbered by Rcspondent's earlier commitments
to MDI. becausc his prc-Decree ncunbrancc ofhis "share" takes precedence over the
division and distribution in the Dccrcc. as it cxtinguishcd any debt or obligation of Mr.
Mitchcll befbre the Decrcc was entercd.s In essence, Mr. Mitchcll is arguing that his
assignment d "his intcrcst" in thc partics' urrcalizcd 
^Dd 
undivided judgtrrent proceeds
removed this inlcrcst liom thc marilal cstate. 'fhis atgumcnt lirils both becau:ic Mr.
Milchcll 's prrj-divorcc i lssignmcnl - or conlract lo assign "his inlcrcsl" in the Coll ins
.iudSmcrt crcatcd obligations lo MDI nnd bccausc Mr. Mitchell 's contracl with Ml)l did
nol and could not- dctcrmine Ms. Milclrcll 's intercst in this part ol 'thc marilal cslatc.
B. Th€ Contractual Assignmcna by Mr. Miachell of. 'His lnteres(" in the
Collins Judgment o MDI Created Obligations to MDl.
Rather than estahlishing that Mr. Mitchell owod no lurthcr obligation to MDl. Mr.
Mitchell's assignmcnt or contract o assign - "his inlcrcst" itr the pat.ties' Collins
Judgmcnt creatcd obligations in Mr. Mitchell to MDl.
Mr. Mitchell citestothc case of S/reanr v. lVarr.2002 LJ] 2.l. !139,.14 P.3d 742.
754 (holding abrogatcd on olher grounds conccmiDg p:.oper standard ol'review lbr
lindings of fbct ofcases heard in equity). in support ol thq propositjon and arguurenr that,
because Mr. Mitchell 's assigrunenr of ' l t is sharc' ol 'thc CoJlins 
.judgmert was a legal'
' Rrjel ofAppellant. pp. 12,
assignment, o bc interpretcd according to thc ordinary rules ol'contmct consfuction. and
because the writing evidencing this 'legal' assignment unconditionally assigned his
interest in the paflies' Collins Judgmcnt, he owed no 'debt or obligation' ro MDI at rhe
time of the Dccree.6 This argument is untenable as it is ignores the nalure of the
obligations inhercntly created through contract or assignment, its core tenant (..that an
unconditional'legal'assignment extinguishes borh dcbt and obligation") is unsupported
by case law or logic, and it fails under thc very contract analysis and determination
lirrwarded by Mr. Mitchcll.
First. Speaf.t 'does stand lbr thc proposition that ..laln assignmcnt is interpretcd as
is any other contract." /z/. llowevcr, to say that this means that an assignment
extinguishos all obligations ignorcs thc axionratic rcality thar a conrract. by dcfinilion-
creates obligalions betwccn parlics.? Cj Mark Technologies (\rp. v. lltah Resources
lnlern., lnc., 2006 tlT App 4 | 8, ,t17. 147 P.3d 509 (exprcss bcsl ellbrts clause creatcs an
independent contractual obligation); ,S/a/e v. Green,2OO4lu'l' 76. !7. 99 p.3d 820
(legislature prcscribes $c duties and obligations crearcd by con]u]act to ury):, pDe Lube
(:enter, lnc. v. Huher,949 P.2d792 (Utah App. 1997) (trial court correctly tcrminatcd
obligation to perlbmr on contract); .Se4re y. University of lJtuh School of Medicine, 882
P.2d 673 (tltah App. 1994) (court deremrines obligatiqrs under ambiguous conract by
looking to extrinsic cvidence).
"  Br iefofAppel lanr,  pp.  l4-  l5.
'Thef i .srdcf in i t ionolcontr .ctntBlacksLawDicr ionaryis. . l .  An agrecmerl t  b€rwecn rwo or more parLics
creat ingobl igat ionsthatarccnforceablcorothcrwiserecogniablcartaw<abindihgconlract>. . .B[A(]K,sl .Aw
DlcroNARY 38 1 (7'i ed. 1999).
Furlher. Mr. Mitchell's citcs no authority for the proposition that an assignment ol'
an uncollected and undividedioint interest in thc proceeds ofaiudgmcnt. in satisf-aclion
o1'a deb1, rclieves lhc assignor ofany and all obligation to the assjglee. This is likely
bccause no such authority exists. C.f. First American Conmerce Co. v.ltrashingtott M\t.
Sav- Bank,743 P.2d | 193. I 194 (tjtah 191t7) (holding that assignment ofright to reccive
payment did not extinguish duties under contract and distinguishing bet\acen assignmcnt
ol rights ancldclcgation ofduties). lndecd. pcrsu.rsivc authority suggesls that the
(tpposite is truc. C.f, Ho.fferberth v. Duckefl. l'75 A.D. 480. 162 N.Y.S. 167 (rn
assigrunent ol moneys to be collccted is valid. and takcs c1lect upon thc t'und ()f propcrty
whei c()llected or rcccivcd).
Firrally. the writtcn ternls ol Mr. Mi(chcll 's contrdcl u,i(h or nssignmcnt toMDI
rcvcals txrth inrplicit and explicit obligatiorrs crcatcd. ' l  hc lcticr ol 'May 7. 199{i. l lonr
Mr. Mitchcll 's counscl. Mr. Scott l]. Mitchcll. k) MDI s managcr. Mr. Gcorgc Kclle).IV.
(hcreinallcr the "Assignmcnt Leltcr") was signed by Rcspondcnt. his a(tornc)'. Scotl B.
Mitchcll. uncl Mr. Kellcy. but was nol signed or acknowlcdged by Ms. Mitchcll.
Thc Assignrncnt Letter. wlrich on ils l'dcc and by Mr. Mjrchcll's own citaliorl,
adnission iurcl argument. conlirns thc agrecmcnt betwccn Mr. Mitchell and his
individual creditor. MDI, reads. in relevant parl:
This letter will conllrm that we have aereed to thc
tbllowing settlemcnt terms:
l. Nal \\ ' i11assii.:n to MDI [quity PartDer. 1,.L.C.. A!Id.
his interest in the iudqmcnt \\,hich he and his wil'e havc
aqainst Stcvc Collins. Frank Mesmcr will continue to collect
thcjudgment in accordance with the cunent arraneement
bet\een them, u'hich, as you know. includes a enc-third
contingency l'ee. MDIl1ill be entitled to Nat's share ofany
amount collected.
2. MDI will assign to Nat all of its interest in the notes
andjudgment against Nat which it holds. MDI represents that
it holds all of the notes and judgments involving Nat.
Jefferson. Currier & Company. Inc.. the Bank ofNew
England. and the FDIC. so that therc is nothing out there
r,l'hich may come back to haunt Nat at somc latcr date. Ml)I
q'ill lile a Satisf'action 01'Judgnent with the court.s
Here the agleefient cvidenced by thc Assignmenl Lettcl orcates explicit
obligati(ms in Mr. Mitchcll to continue collcction ofthe Coll irs' . lud8mcnt through his
attomcy. Mr. Frank Mcsnrer, as well as an implicil obligation to dctcrDine "his intcrcst in
thc.iudgmenl' vis-ri-vis his thcn wile.') l hesc obligations cxistcd at thc ti lne ol thc parties
I)ccrcc. Irurther. thc clcaf intcnl of Mr. Mitchcll cvidenccd by tlrc Assignmcnt l,cttcr is
that he w.Ls assigning "lris sharc" ol'thc p(rcecds ol'thc Collins .ludgnrcnt. nol crcaling a
prc-dislrihu(i(n1 l ien cntit l ing him to seck anothcr "sharc" ol thc procccds.
In lact. althoLLgh it did rclieve Mr. Mit0hcll ofthe debt ol thciudgnents discLrsscd,
mtltcr than extinguishing his obligation to Ml)1, Mr. Mitchell 's assignDrent ofhis sharc ol'
the Collins iudgment to MDI crcated obligations which $'erc not. and rctrospecljvely
could not be. satisfied unti l aftet entry of thc pdrties' Dccrcc. such as the division ol the
parties.ioint interest. Notabl). undcr the plain language oflhe Assignmcnt Letter. Mr.
Mitclrcll's agreenent dggS-IjI! purport to divide the joint interest of the panies in rhc
" App€llafis Addendutu lv (crDhasis added).
- The Assignme Lener. arguabl), also cHtes an obligalion in N.l.- jvlitchellto ensure paymenrof_'his lbre to
MDI.
sharcd Collins judgment, undoubtedly because the parties' interests were not divided
"nr i l  An+r! /  ^ f+hD Ir-^---
Thus. Mr. Mitchell's pre-Decree assignment did not remove "his interest" in the
Collins Judgment from the rnarital estale, becausc it did not detcm ne what'his interest"
in the Collins Judgment, and the Mr. Mitchell's obligation to determine the assigned
interest remained at the time ofthe Decree. Funher, Mr. Mitchell was not entitled to
determine Ms. Mitchell's interest in the Collins Judgmen( though a contract with a third
party. bec{use enforcement o1'such a contract against Ms. Mitchell is barred by Utah's
Statutc of|rauds.
D. Utah's Statute of Frauds Prohibits Enforcing Mr. Mitchell's
Interpretation ofthe Decre€ Against Ms. Mitchell.
Utah's Statute of Frauds expressly prohibirs enlbrcing Mr. Mitchell's
interpretation of the l)ecree, because Ms. Mitchell was neither a party nor signatory to the
Assignmcnt Lener and because (hc principal writ ing cvidcncing Ms. Mitchcll 's intcn(
concerDing the allocation and distribulion ol'the Collins judgrnent is the Decree.
Acoordingly, Mr. Mitchell's attempl ro charye Ms, M jtchell rhrough his 1998
ncgotiations ofhis debt is barred by thc Statute of Frauds.
Utah's Statutc of Frauds. specifically Section 25-5-4 ofthe tjrah Code states- in
rclcvant part:
( l ) The following agreements arc void unless the
agreement. or some notc or mcmorandun ofthe
agreenent. is in writing, signed by the party to be
charged with thc agrccment commitmenl:
(a) every agreemenl that by its terms is not be
perlbmed within onc ycar liom thc making of
tne agreement;
every promise to answer for the debt, dcfault, or
miscaniagc ol another. ,,
tjtai Code Ann, S25-5-4(l). On its 1'ace. the Statute states that agreements. which arc not
to be performed within one yc4r or contain a promisc to answcr lbr the debt ofanother.
are void unless they are written and signcd by thc party to be charged with the
commitment. lhus. enforcemen( ol'Agreemcnt Lettcr. which was not signcd by Ms.
Mitchcll. was not by its temrs to bc pcrlbrmed within a year ol'its making. and. under the
intcrprctation of the DecrL'e aryued by Mr, Mitchcll. was a promise lbr Ms. Mitchell to
answer lbr the debl ol'anothcr'. is baned by thc Statutc ol'lirauds.
This application ol'this scction ol I J(ah's Statutc ol' l, rauds is oonsisterrt with
[Jtah's wcll-cstablishcd law conccrning thc application ofthe statulc ol li.ruds to transl'crs
of'undividcd,.ioint intercst in rcal p()pcrty. See Centennial Inv. (it.. LLC v. Ntttall .
2007 U'l App 321 . | 7 P.3d 458 ( rcal cstatc purchasc ontract purporting thc trunsl'cr joint
interest invalid undcr thc statute ol'liauds without signarure oforher holder ofjoint
interest). ,gee 4/.i? Kremrz v. Holr,8l9 P.2d 352. 353 (Ljtah l99l) ("ll- [ex-husband]
retained ajoint interest in thc property. his writtcr consent o the propeny's sale would be
necessary. not beoausc ot any clause in the agreement, but because the Utah statute of
frauds so requires."); Williams y, Singleton.723 P.2d 421 , 123 ( Utah I 986) ("Onc j oint
tenant or tenant in commoo cannot bind his cotenant by a contract u'hich he may nake
relating to the commor property."); Ec*ard v. Smith" 52'l P,2d 660. 662 (Utah I 974)
(b)
(holding thal statutc of f'rauds prcvented wife, as joint owner ofpropeny. from the
obligation to convey building where she never signed thc lease which contained thc
purpolted purchase option).
Accordingly, Mr. Mitcbell's assignmcnt agraement with MDl. both did not and
could not detemine Ms. Mitcl.rell's interest irr the Collins Judgment. Thus, Mr.
Mitchell's assignmeDt agrecment could not bc enlbrced against hc entire proceeds.
against Ms. Mitchell, and had an existing obligation MDI to cstablish ' 'his interest" in the
Collins Judgment. which was establisltcd by the Dccree.
E. The Pqrties' lnt€rest in the Proceeds of the Collins Judgment was
Divided by the Decree.
As set lirnh above. Mr. Mitchell's assigulucnl ()1- 'his share" ol'thc procceds liolr
thc Cloll ins Judgment did not and could not dctcrn1ine the partics' relativc interest in the
p()cceds lioln thc Collins.ludgmcnt. 'l'hus thc partics' intcrest in the proceeds ol lhc
Collins Judgmcnt wcrc detelmiied ,nd allocated by the clcar and unambiguous languagc
in the parties' Decree, v',hich awarded euch ol'the panies "one-halfol'any pnrcceds
reccived liom thc Collins lawsuit."'u
F. Ms. Mitchell 's Awareness of Mr, Mitchell 's Assignment to MDI, Mr.
Miachell's lntentions and Interpreaation ofthe Decree Are Disputed
and Not at lssue in This Appeal,
Mr. MiLchell inappropriately raises and argues l-aots, rlhich werc disputed and not
established in thc district court and which werc not ruised ard are not at issue in this
' "  R.39.
l0
appeal. Indeed, the 'facts' raised by Mr. Mitchell in support of bis inappropriate
atgument conceming Ms. Mitchell's awareness and involvement in Mr. Mitchell's
interpretation ofthe Decrcc were disputed and ref'uted by Ms, Mitchell's profl'errcd
testimony in the hearing held April 22.2009. These disputed l'acts include: 1) that Ms.
Mitchell undeNtood that the parties were to split the proceeds. with Mr. Mitchell to do
whatever he needed to do with his half.rr 2) that Ms. Mitchell was unaware ofthe receipt
or ()1'thc total amount ofthe timt August 2002 check liom attorncy Mesmer.12 3) that Ms.
Mitchcll believed that the roughly $66.000.00 check *,hich thc parties split were the
procecds net atlorney lbcs. not t-he proceeds net attomey fecs and Mr. Mitchcll's
obligation to MDI.rr and 4) l lrat Mr. Mitchcll did not reveal that his obligation te MDI
had already been paid and the l'unds being splits were, in fact. Ms. Mitchell's portion of
thc pnlcccds.rr
Nonetheless and dcspite the clear disputc bclow and the l'act thal thc dispuled lbcts
were not raised and arc not at issue in this appeal, Mr. Mitchell inappropriately recounts
as'l 'acts'matteniwhichartncitherestablishednoratissue.' lhisCounshouldnot
entcfiain such tactics, and should declinc to address the issues, argumcnts and allcgcd
facts so raised.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY INTERPR,ETTED THE DECREE
AND DID NOT ERR IN ORDIRINC THf, PROCEEDS BE DISTRIBUTED
ACCORDINC TO THf, PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE DECREE.
"  R.222r i5.
' '  R.222:t6-t7.
' '  
R.222: t i .
' "  R.222.11-18.
I I
Mr, Mitchell argues that the district oourt erred, as a matter oflaw, in linding that
Mr. Mitchell's assignment of "his inrerest" in the Collins Judgment was Mr. Mitchell's
individual obligation. instead ofruling that, by his assignment. Mr. Mitchell had removed
"his interest" liom the marital estate, leaving only Ms. Mitchell's interesr to be
considered as pru;eeds ol thc Collins Judgment at the time ol'thc Decree. As sct forth
hercin above, the district court did not err in rcjecting the interpretation ofthe f)ecroc
argu0d by Mr. Mitchell. lrurthcr. the district coufl ruled coffectly that the unambiguous
language ofthe partics' Dccrce means that:
eash party is ontitled to onelrall'ofthc proceeds ol'the
Collins Judgnrcnt, that cach par(y is rcsponsiblc lirr his or her
own deb1s. that" as Mr. Mitchell 's asserted in his pleadings,
Mr. Mitchcll 's portion of thc ('oll ins judgment was
cncumbercd with his obligation to MDI. as rcll as his
obligation to Mr. Mesmer. and. therelbre, rhat Ms. Mitchcll is
entitled to one-hall'( l/2) thc prooceds l'rom thc Clollins
judgment. nct thc parties' aBrccldl payment ol onc-third the
greoss procecds to Mr. Mesmcr, ll.llllnet the partics' obligation
L,) Mr. M('snrer l lnd Vr. Mirchcll s ohligurion lo \41)1.' '
Consistent with thc arguments ct lbrth above, Mr. Mitchell is
incorrect in his assertion that thc unambiguous language ol-
thc Decrcc mandatcs that cach party. including Mr. Mitchell.
was entitled to one-halfol thc $66.274.79 check receivcd
liom Mr. Mcsmer in Augusl2008, as Mr. Mitchcll 's one-hall '
interest in the proceeds had aJrcady bccn distributcd to his
attomey and MDI and Mr. Mitchell was not entitled to
receive additional sums ftom Ms. Mitchell's sharc ofthe
proceeds.
Findings and Ordef (Hearing April 22, 2009), p. 3, 1a. (Appellanr's Addendum l) lhe
Coun should uphold the decision ofthe district coul't, as it was nol. an eror 01'law for the
t2
' '  R.  i9.
district coufl to order that thc entire Collins Judgment proceeds bc distributed according
to the plain languagc ofthc parties' Dccree.
IIL THIS COURT SHOULD NOT DISTURB TIIE RULING OR FINDING
BELOW.
Finally. Mr. Mitchcll challenges certain language in thc district courts' Findings
and Order (I learing April 22,2009). as clcarly a enoneous finding.'" Thc Coun should
not entcrtain MI. Mitchell's challenge as he did n()t preseNe his objcction to thc
challcnged language in the district court belew. Thc ('ouft shoLrld also declinc to
considcr Mr. Mitchell 's 4rgunenl bccause Mr. Mitchcll l tas lailcd to ntecl the
marshalling requirements lbr consideration ol'his assignment ol effor. l:itrally. thc C-'our1
should not dislurb the ruling bclow. rs thc languagc is ncither clcarly clroncous nor a
linding ol'the (lourt. as thc particular challcngcd languagc is a mathematical descriptor ol'
the distribution ol thc 2002 Cloll ins Judgmcnr procceds and Mr. Mitchcll s inappropriare
rctention ofapproximately $30,000.00 ofthcsc proccccls upporled by substantl.rl
cvidencc.
A. M1. Mitchell Failed to Preserve His Objection lo ahe Challeng€d
Language Below.
'l'he Court should not address Mr. Mitchell's challenge because he l'ailed k)
adcquately preserve the issue raised for appeal. Wheth$ the (lourt will address an issue
"depends on rvhether the issue was adequately preserved fbr appeal. That is. rhe trial
court must be ollerad an opportunity to rule on an issnc." Spears v. Warr.2002l'f 24.
r6 Brief of Appellanr, p. 20.
I3
1tl1.44 P.3d'712,148 (cluoting 
-Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co..966 P.2d 844, 847 (tltah
1998) (citations and intemal punctuation omitted). Here. Mr. Mitchell did not adequately
preserve his objection because he did not ol'l'er the district corul the oppofunily to rule on
the matter about which he now complarns.
Mr. Mitchell objected to the Comlnission|-r's Recommendation.rT However, thc
specific language Mr. Mitchell takes issue rvith was not in the Commissioner's Minute
Entry.rs Although. tr '. Mitchell made l'actual allegations which are contradictory to the
language to which he take exception, hc did not object to the lbnn or content ofthe
Findings and Order (Hearing April 22, 2009). as his Obiection to Commissioner's
Recommendation and arguDent hercin was submitted prior to thc district court's ordcr.
^See Resporrdent's Objection lo thc Contmissioncr's l leconmcndalionre; Finclings and
Order (flearing Apri | 22, 2009\20 . By not objecting or raising the issue of rhe specillc
languagc he now takes exoeplion to, Mr. Mitchell l'ailed to give the disrricl court the
opponunily 10 rule and. thus. I'ailcd to adequatcly preservc thc issuc lbr appcal.2r
B. Mr. MitchellFailed to Adequately Marshal the Evidence.
'fhe Coufi should not address Mr. Mitchell's challenge because he l'ailed to meot
his marshalling requirement. Under the wetl-established rules and case law. "liln order
to challenge a court's t'actual lindillgs, an appellant must first marshal all the evidence in
' '  
R. r07-138.
' '  R.96-100.
'  R. r 07- l3 8.
' "  R. r55-16t.
'' Even il through his Objection tothe Comnissioner's Recommendalion and arsument. Mr. Mitchelldid presenL
thc dislricl court wilh an oppodunit! to rule oh this issue, he did not include in the record rhe fanscriploflhe
october 20, 2009 hearihg beforc Judge Medle], where such argumenhroutd have bcen leard and shoutd forfeir any
oppotun;ly to raise the issue nou.
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support ofthe finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insulficient to
supporl the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the cQurt belou'."
Boyer v. Boyer,2008 UT App. I18, !l 2l (citing Cten 1,. Stewart.2004 \JT E2. 'i 76, 100
P.3d I t 77 (intemal quotation marks onitted) and Utah R.App. P. 24(aX9) ("A party
challenging a thct l-rnding must first marshal all record evidence thal supports the
chalJenged finding."). Adequate nlarshalling requires appellant to "present ... every
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very lindings [she]
resiss." Clrcn,2004 UTatfl 77, l00P.3dtl77. Here, Mt. Mitchell has presented some
evidencc in support of the challenged finding, but has not met his marshalling burden-
['br example, Mr. Mitch€ll, somewhat facetiously, assumes "lirl thc purpose of his
narshall ing requircment thal thc represcntations ol'Ms. Mitchell s counscl set fonll in an
unverilied menrorandum constitute evidence"22 However. Mr. Mitchell ignores thc
profl'ered testimony of Ms. Mitchell in the hearing held April 22. 2009. wherein thc
district court was prescnted with hcr testimony that:
1) that Ms. Milchell was uraware oflhe receipt or ofthe lotal amount ofthe lirs1
August 2002 check liom attomey Mesmer, which was not disclosed or
conccaled by Mr. Mitchell: 2l
2) that Ms. Mitchell believed that the roughly $66.000.00 chcck which the panics
split wcre the procecds net attorncy fees;24
: r  Br ieiofAFp€l lanr.  ! .  20.fb. :0.
" 
R.222:16-17.
'o R.222.11.
l5
3) that Ms. Mitchell was attempting to keep her distance from Mr. Mitchell and
there were inegularities and disputes suffounding the splitting ofthe
$66,000.00 between Ms. Mitcheli and Mr. Mitchell, but she wouldn't have
agreed to the split if she had known that Mr. Mitcheli was claiming or
receiving proceeds from her share;25
4) that Mr. Mitchell did not reveal that his obligation to MDI had already been
paid aDd the funds bcing spli[s were, in f'act, Ms. Mitchell's portion ofthe
proceeds;20 and
5) that Ms. Mitchell believes he was deccived or frauded by Mr. Mitchell in
2002 and that she came to thc realization in 2008, aller discussing the
distribution with thc parlies'attorncy, Mr. Mesnrcr.2?
Mr. Mitchell also fails to acknowledgo that acopy ofthe roughly X;l{10.000
endorsed check. which he claims Ms. Mitchcll had lull knorledgc ol. is conspicuous!y
lacking. dcspitc his rcady supply ofendorsed checks which hc belicves support his
position. as a [ac[ l'avoring the district courl's language. He also does not acknowledgc
thal he. indeed, retained the l/6 ol'the 2002 Collins Judgment proceeds-'?3
ln short. Mr- Mitchell has failed to marshal the evidence prescnted to the Coun in
suppofl ofthe challenged language. and, as a consequence. this Court should decline to
entertain his chal engc.
C. The Challenged Language is Neither a Finding Nor Clearly Erroneous.
"  
R.222: t6.5 R.222: l7-18.
"  
R.222:18.
'?3 Briefol Appellant. p.2r-22.
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The Court should not disturb the ruling below. as the language is neither clearly
erroneous nor a linding ofthe Court. The panicular challenged language is a
mathematical dcscriptor ofthe distribution ol'the 2002 Collins Judgment proceeds noting
Mr. Mitchcll's inappropriate relcntion of approxirnately $30,000.00. Dcspite this. as
outlined above" the evidencc presented to the district court supports the sums &ld
propo|1ions retained. as well as the district coults' pronouncement (hat Mr. Mitchcll
fbrced distribution and inapproprintcly ret.rincd l/6 of the gross proceeds liom Ms.
Mitchell's court-ordercd sharc.
Accordingly. us thc challcngcd larrguage isnot against thc clctr weight ol the
cvidence and Mr. Mitchell did nol nlctt his marshalling hurden or preserve thc issuc for
appeal bclow, the (\)urf should not disturb thc ruling bclow. See I'urduhn v. Bennett,
200s t f r '22.130. l  r2 P.3d 4es.
CONCLTJSION
'l 'hc parties'Dccrcc is unanrLriguous and thc district coufl did not cn in
intcr?reting its meaning and application. as ntatler ol la\ '. Under thc Decree. cach party
is entit led to one-hali ' the procccds l ionl thc Coll ins' judgmenl, cach is responsihle for
their own obligations relatcd to lhc same mories. and Mr. Mitchell's assignment ol'' his
jnterest" in the Coll ins Judgnlent was his own individual obligation. Additionally.
although thc district cou s' language or finding \r,as not clearly erroneous. the Court
should not addlcss Mr'. Mitchell's assignment of enor, as hc did not preserve this issue
for appeal in thc trial court and did not meet his burden to ma$hal the cvidence In
17
support ofthe ruling. Accordingly and for the reasons et forth above, the Utah Court of
Appeals hould affirm the distdct coult's ruling applying proper principles ofcontract
interpretation to the plain and unambiguous language ofthe parties' Decree in allocating
the parties debls and obligations and dividing the paiies' int€rest in the Collins
Judgment.
Dated this 4h day of May 2010.
PRANNO ASHWORTII LAW. PLLC
Albert N. Pranno
Atlorneys for Petitioner / Aryellee
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